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Aim of the Study: The study examines how neurobiological and genetic explanations of
psychopathy influence decision-making of German law students about legal and moral
responsibility and sentencing of a defendant in a case of manslaughter. Previous studies
from the United States and Germany have been criticized because they partly contradict
legal analyses of real-world criminal cases. With a modified design, which integrates the
main criticism, we re-examined the impact of biological explanations for psychopathy
on decision-making in the courtroom.
Methods: We developed an improved quasi-experimental design to probe three
case vignettes presenting different explanations of psychopathy in a criminal case of
manslaughter. All three vignettes present the same information about a forensic expert’s
testimony that is said to report compelling evidence for the diagnosis of “psychopathy.”
The independent variable being manipulated is the type of information supporting the
expert diagnosis: either no biological explanation of “psychopathy” versus a neurological
explanation (brain injury) versus a genetic explanation (MAOA gene). The outcome
measure is a questionnaire on legal and moral responsibility, free will, the type of custody,
and the duration of the sentence. The study is adequately powered. We openly publish
the data and all statistical analyses as reproducible R scripts.
Results: The answers of German law students (n = 317) indicate that the omission
of a neurobiological explanation is significantly associated with higher ratings of
legal responsibility while compared to no biological explanation. However, there was
no significant difference on the prison sentencing and type of custody assigned.
Furthermore, there was no difference in the self-reported impact of the explanation of
psychopathy on the participants’ decision-making.
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Conclusion: Our findings from German law students corroborates previous research on
German judges but is markedly distinct from studies on United States judges. Whereas
in the United States, biological information seems to have a mitigating effect, it seems to
increase the rate of involuntary commitment to forensic psychiatric hospitals in Germany.
Keywords: neurolaw, neuroscience evidence, responsibility, culpability, psychopathy
INTRODUCTION
Both United States courts and commentators have discussed
the use of neuroscientific and genetic evidence in criminal
cases as a “double-edged sword” for the defendant (Denno,
2012). On the one side, such evidence has a mitigating
potential because it reduces the culpability of the defendant.
On the other side, it can be an aggravating factor because
it supports the assumption of future dangerousness.
However, the United States legal theorist Denno (2015),
who has analyzed hundreds real criminal cases, in which
biological evidence was introduced, calls the double-edged
sword theory a myth.
Indeed, neuroscience and genetic evidence is increasingly
being introduced in criminal cases in the United States (Denno,
2012, 2015; Denno and McGivney, 2013; Farahany, 2015), in
Canada (Chandler, 2015), Western Europe (Catley and Claydon,
2015; De Kogel and Westgeest, 2015), and Australia (Alimardani
and Chin, 2018). In most of these cases, clinically established
techniques such as EEG, structural brain imaging, and positron
emission tomography have been used to demonstrate brain
damage, whereas fMRI and neurogenetics have been used only
in few cases (Fuss, 2016).
This paper contributes to the debate about the double-edged
sword theory. First, we review the debate about the nature and the
causes of psychopathy, and discuss its particular importance for
criminal justice. Then we summarize the results of experimental
studies investigating the double-edged sword effect.
The main part of the paper presents the results of our own
experimental study that has investigated how neurobiological
and genetic explanations of psychopathy influence the decision-
making of German law students about legal and moral
responsibility and sentencing of a defendant in a case of
manslaughter. Our own study is based on older studies, but we
have modified the design in order to integrate the main criticism
of these studies.
Finally, we discuss the reasons for the inconsistent results
of the different studies in the light of studies which have
comprehensively analyzed real criminal cases in different
countries. We suggest that the question whether neuroscientific
and genetic evidence in criminal cases is a double-edged
sword cannot be answered in general. Rather, the answer
depends strongly on the system of criminal justice of
a given country.
Abbreviations: α, level of significance of the probability value;χ2, chi-squared; η2p,
partial eta-squared; df, degrees of freedom; M, mean; MAOA, monoamine oxidase
A; n, number of participants for a given subset of the sample; N, total number of
participants in the sample; OFC/VLPFC, orbitofrontal plus ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex; SD, standard deviation; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
The Nature and the Causes of
Psychopathy and Its Particular
Importance for Criminal Justice
Psychopathy is in the focus of neuroscientific and
genetic research, although after a long and controversial
debate (Crego and Widiger, 2015), it was not included
as a stand-alone personality disorder in the DSM-5
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
The focus on psychopathy is justified because psychopathy
is “one of the strongest dispositional predictors of aggression
and violence” (Reidy et al., 2015). Psychopaths commit the most
severe acts of violence; they commit twice as many violent crimes
as non-psychopathic offenders and their risk of violent recidivism
is at least five times higher (Reidy et al., 2015).
According to the influential psychopathy researcher
Hare (1996, p. 25), psychopathy is “a devastating disorder
defined by a constellation of affective, interpersonal and
behavioral characteristics, including egocentricity; impulsivity;
irresponsibility; shallow emotions; lack of empathy, guilt or
remorse; pathological lying; manipulativeness; and the persistent
violation of social norms and expectations.” Hare (1996, p. 26)
describes psychopaths as “intraspecies predators who use charm,
manipulation, intimidation, and violence to control others and
to satisfy their own selfish needs. Lacking in conscience and in
feelings for others, they cold-bloodedly take what they want and
do as they please, violating social rules without the slightest sense
of guilt or regret.”
For the diagnosis of psychopathy, forensic psychiatrists mostly
use the Hare (2003) Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PDL-R) and
its derivatives (Reidy et al., 2015).
There are two opposing perspectives on psychopathy: (1)
psychopathy is a mental disorder based on structural and
functional dysfunctions of several brain areas, and (2) the
developmental form of psychopathy is a moral or social disorder,
but not a biological disorder.
Blair (2013) promotes the first perspective by describing
psychopathy as a developmental disorder characterized by
pronounced emotional deficits marked by reduction in guilt and
empathy, and increased risk for displaying antisocial behavior.
Blair (2013) emphasizes that psychopathy is not equivalent to
antisocial personality disorder from the diagnostic systems DSM-
IV-R or ICD-10, which focus on the antisocial behavior rather
than underlying causes, i.e., the emotion dysfunction. Blair (2013)
has suggested that the emotion dysfunction relates to three
core functional impairments: the association of stimuli with
reinforcement, the representation of expected value information
and prediction error signaling. He hypothesizes that these
functional impairments relate to the observed dysfunction seen
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in structural and functional MRI studies within the amygdala,
vmPFC, and (only in youth populations) striatum (Blair, 2013).
Reimer (2008) suggests describing psychopathy without the
language of disorder. According to an evolutionary model,
psychopathy represents an alternative genetic strategy that is
successful only at a particular low relative frequency in the
population (Reimer, 2008). This idea is supported by game-
theoretical models of non-cooperators who move between groups
and “prey” on naïve cooperators (Dugatkin, 1992). This idea
has been elaborated in sociobiology. Mealey (1995) explained
sociopathy as “the expression of a frequency-dependent life
strategy which is selected, in dynamic equilibrium, in response
to certain varying environmental circumstances.” Reimer (2008)
suggests that psychopaths are not disordered in any biological
sense, but only different from the majority of people. Psychopaths
are not impaired, but especially capable. They have a “pro-
individual personality” with special capacities for “successful
individualization” (Reimer, 2008). Particularly, they are capable
of ignoring the distress of others and are better able to resist
attempts at “moral” social reinforcing (Reimer, 2008). With
regard to the amygdala-dysfunction theory of psychopathy,
Reimer (2008) does not deny the role of the amygdala. Rather
she says that the special development of the amygdala enables the
“pro-individual personality” to successfully pursue the person’s
goals, including reproductive ones, “without the hindrances
imposed by other regarding norms” (Reimer, 2008). In this
way, the “pro-individual personality” is able to insure the
dissemination of her pro-individual genes in future generations
(Reimer, 2008).
The view that psychopathy is a moral disorder that is not
caused by a lack of capacities is supported by a study suggesting
that psychopaths do understand the distinction between right
and wrong, but do not care about such knowledge or the
consequences that ensue from their morally inappropriate
behavior (Cima et al., 2010).
Particularly the fact that many psychopaths are successful
supports Reimer’s suggestion to describe psychopathy without
the language of disorder. Babiak and Hare (2006) found a
higher rate of psychopaths in the business world than in the
general population (3.5% vs. 0.6–1%). Although both successful
(not incarcerated) and unsuccessful (incarcerated) psychopaths
show autonomic hyporeactivity (low resting heart rate), reduced
emotional empathy, risky decision making and sensation-
seeking, the successful psychopaths seem to have intact or even
enhanced neurobiological functioning, which enables them to
lie, con and manipulate successfully (Gao and Raine, 2010).
In contrast, unsuccessful psychopaths have more cognitive and
emotional deficits and tend to violent offending instead of white
collar criminality (Gao and Raine, 2010).
In 1996, Hare (1996) noted that in most jurisdictions,
psychopathy is considered an aggravating rather than a
mitigating factor in determining criminal responsibility.
However, research evidence explaining psychopathy in terms
of an affective deficit, a thought disorder or brain dysfunction
might lead some to view psychopathy as a mitigating factor
(Hare, 1996). Hare (1996) considers a psychiatrist’s speculation
that psychopathy would perhaps become “the kiss of life rather
than the kiss of death” in first-degree murder cases, as “appalling,
because psychopaths are calculating predators whose behavior
must be judged by the rules of the society in which they live.”
The causes of psychopathy are controversial. Early studies
investigated correlations between physiological indices such
as heart rate and electrodermal activity with aggression,
psychopathy/sociopathy, and conduct problems (Lorber, 2004).
Low autonomic activity might contribute to the development
of antisocial and criminal behavior, because it is a marker
for fearlessness, and leads to sensation-seeking behavior
(Raine, 2002).
Prenatal factors also contribute to antisocial and violent
behavior, particularly pregnancy complications, birth
complications, maternal smoking and alcohol consume
during pregnancy; these factors strongly interact with each other
(Raine, 2002).
Current research concentrates on the neurotransmitters
serotonin, dopamine and vasopressin, the steroid hormones
testosterone and cortisol, and brain structure and function
(Rosell and Siever, 2015). Particularly, the amygdala, the
prefrontal cortex and the striatum are in the focus of research
(Rosell and Siever, 2015). However, the phenomenological
heterogeneity of aggression is a source of inconsistencies between
studies, and the categorical nature of psychiatric diagnoses is
another critical issue (Rosell and Siever, 2015).
Sociopathy or chronic antisocial behavior can be a
developmental or an acquired disorder (Mendez, 2009).
The most famous case of acquired sociopathy caused by brain
injury certainly is Phineas Gage. This case has become a scientific
myth, perhaps because it is fascinating to watch someone break
bad (Kean, 2014). Focal lesions affecting vmPFC and adjacent
OFC/VLPFC include strokes, trauma, tumors, infections, and
a ruptured anterior commissure aneurysm, and can lead to
alterations in social and moral behavior (Mendez, 2009).
A meta-analysis of 43 structural and functional imaging
studies showed significantly reduced prefrontal structure and
function in antisocial individuals (Yang and Raine, 2009). A study
with 56 males showed that men with lower amygdala volume
exhibited higher levels of aggression and psychopathic features
from childhood to adulthood (Pardini et al., 2014).
A systematic mapping of lesions with known temporal
association to criminal behavior has revealed that the lesion sites
are spatially heterogenous, including the medial prefrontal cortex
and the orbitofrontal cortex. However, all these lesions are part of
a unique functionally connected brain network, which is involved
in moral decision making (Darby et al., 2018).
Evidence from behavioral genetics supports the conclusion
that a significant amount of the variance in antisocial personality
is due to genetic contributions. A meta-analytic review on
behavioral genetic etiological studies of antisocial personality and
behavior showed that 56% of the variance of antisocial personality
and behavior can be explained through genetic influences, with
11% due to shared non-genetic influences and 31% due to unique
non-genetic influences (Ferguson, 2010).
Particularly prominent is the MAOA gene, which is located
on the X-chromosome. It encodes the MAOA enzyme,
which metabolizes norepinephrine, serotonin and dopamine
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2343
fpsyg-10-02343 October 14, 2019 Time: 16:55 # 4
Guillen Gonzalez et al. Neuroscientific Evidence in Criminal Cases
(Caspi et al., 2002). In males, a point mutation in the MAOA
gene, which causes a complete MAOA deficiency, is associated
with abnormal aggressive behavior and impulsivity in a large
Dutch kindred (Brunner et al., 1993).
Caspi et al. (2002) found in males a gene × environment
interaction between the MAOA gene and childhood
maltreatment. Maltreated male children with high MAOA
activity were significantly less likely to develop child conduct
disorder, a disposition toward violence, an adult antisocial
personality disorder and convictions for violent offenses (Caspi
et al., 2002). Although the low-MAOA genotype on its own
did not significantly increase the risk of developing antisocial
behavior, it increased the risk for developing antisocial behavior
among males who suffered maltreatment (Caspi et al., 2002).
Another research group replicated the results of Caspi’s study
through the investigation of another sample of boys and a meta-
analysis (Kim-Cohen et al., 2006).
A Finnish prisoner study with over 500 offenders revealed
that a MAOA low-activity genotype and the CDH13 gene
are associated with severe recidivistic violent behavior
(Tiihonen et al., 2015).
However, a recent systematic meta-analysis did not find any
significant association between any polymorphism analyzed, and
aggression and violence; even subgroup analyses did not show
any consistent findings (Vassos et al., 2014). Since no gene of
major effect for aggression has been identified, the authors of the
meta-analysis consider any approach to use genetic markers for
risk prediction or to mitigate criminal responsibility questionable
(Vassos et al., 2014). Tiihonen and coauthors emphasize, too,
that the sensitivity and specificity of the genotype findings
are much too low for any screening purposes for prevention
of violent offending, and that putative risk factors such as
genotype do not have a legal role in judgment about offenders
(Tiihonen et al., 2015).
The relationship between genes and aggressive and antisocial
behavior is much more complex than formerly believed. On the
one hand, behavioral genetics shows that distinct polymorphisms
of genes, which code for proteins controlling neurotransmitter
function, are associated with individual vulnerability to aversive
experiences, and may result in an increased risk of developing
psychopathologies associated with violence (Palumbo et al.,
2018). On the other hand, epigenetic studies indicate that aversive
experiences particularly during prenatal life, infancy and early
adolescence can introduce lasting epigenetic marks in genes, thus
favoring the emergence of dysfunctional behaviors, including
exaggerated aggression (Palumbo et al., 2018).
In the development of violent behavior and aggression,
biological, psychodynamic and social factors play a role
(Sopromazde and Tsiskaridze, 2018). Social and biological factors
do not have simply an additive effect; rather the presence of
both factors exponentially increases the rates of antisocial and
violent behavior (Raine, 2002). In a good social environment, the
association between biological factors and antisocial behavior is
stronger (Raine, 2002).
Maltreatment during childhood and maternal withdrawal in
infancy are significantly associated with antisocial personality
disorder (Shi et al., 2012). The Cambridge Study in Delinquent
Development, a prospective longitudinal study, which started
in 1961, suggested that “the best predictors of psychopathy”
were “having a convicted parent, physical neglect, low paternal
involvement, low family income, and coming from a disrupted
family” (Reidy et al., 2015). The transmission of psychopathy
is mediated by psychosocial factors, namely the fathers’
employment and accommodation problems, and drug use
(Auty et al., 2015).
Experiments to Investigate the
Double-Edged Sword Theory
For exploring the influence of neurobiological or genetic evidence
on judging in criminal cases, several experimental studies with
both mock jurors and judges have been performed. All but one of
the studies described below are from the United States; only one
study comes from Germany (Fuss et al., 2015).
Gurley and Marcus performed the first controlled study
to examine the influence of neuroimages and neurological
testimony on students’ verdicts in non-guilty by reason of
insanity cases (Gurley and Marcus, 2008). They found that
defendants diagnosed with psychosis were more likely to be
judged non-guilty by reason of insanity than those diagnosed
with psychopathy. Furthermore, the addition of neuroimages
showing brain damage increased the likelihood of such a verdict,
as did testimony stating that the defendant’s disorder began after
a brain injury in a car accident (Gurley and Marcus, 2008).
Greene and Cahill (2012) performed a similar experiment
with psychology students acting as mock jurors in a capital case.
Consistent with the findings of Gurley and Marcus (2008), they
found that both types of neuroscientific evidence had a mitigating
effect by reducing the likelihood that jurors would sentence the
defendant to death (but only for defendants at high risk of
future dangerousness).
Appelbaum and Scurich (2014) investigated the influence
of different explanations of impulsivity on the sentencing of
jurors that were representative for the United States population.
They found that evidence of genetic predisposition for impulsive
behavior, including violence, did affect neither whether the
defendant was convicted of first- or second-degree manslaughter
or first- or second-degree murder, nor the sentence (Appelbaum
and Scurich, 2014). However, participants who received evidence
of childhood abuse or evidence of childhood abuse plus evidence
of genetic predisposition imposed longer sentences (Appelbaum
and Scurich, 2014). Genetic evidence and genetic plus childhood
abuse evidence engendered the greatest fear of the defendant
(Appelbaum and Scurich, 2014).
Recently, Allen et al. (2019) published a modified study
design in order to distinguish between different motivations for
punishment. They assumed that the question whether a given
biological or psychological disorder is treatable has a high impact
on juror’s decision for the type of custody and for the sentence
duration (Allen et al., 2019). They found that both brain evidence
and psychological evidence had mitigating effects on prison
sentencing, whereby brain evidence had a stronger effect (Allen
et al., 2019). However, brain evidence led to decisions for longer
involuntary hospitalizations. They found that the variation in
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sentencing was explained best by “deontological considerations
pertaining to moral culpability” (Allen et al., 2019).
Aspinwall et al. (2012) authors were the first to test
experimentally the influence of genetic evidence on sentencing
decisions of United States judges. In a nationwide experiment,
they presented U.S. state trial judges (N = 181) a hypothetical case
vignette, which was a modification of the famous case of Mobley
v. State (Mobley v. The State, 1995; Mobley v. Head, 2001). In the
case vignette, the offender was convicted of aggravated battery
(instead of murder as in the real case). All participants received
a psychiatric testimony about the offender’s psychopathy. The
study used a 2× 2 design. One group was told that the psychiatric
testimony was presented by the defense; the other one that
it was presented by the prosecution. One group received the
explanation that the offender’s psychopathy was related to his
low-activity MAOA genotype; the other group did not receive any
genetic explanation. The judges were randomly assigned to one of
these four groups. The authors found that the judges considered
the psychiatric testimony about psychopathy aggravating. The
additional presentation of neurogenetic evidence for the
offender’s psychopathy significantly reduced sentencing (from
13.9 to 12.8 years) (Aspinwall et al., 2012).
Fuss et al. (2015) repeated Aspinwall’s study in order to
investigate whether the double-edged sword effect can also be
found in German judges. They found that neurogenetic evidence
significantly reduced the German judges’ estimation of legal
responsibility of the convict. Nevertheless, the average prison
sentence was not influenced. Most interestingly, neurogenetic
evidence presented by the prosecution significantly increased
the number of judges (23% compared with 6%) ordering
an involuntary commitment in a forensic psychiatric hospital
(Fuss et al., 2015). The different results of these two studies
show that the judges’ responses to neurogenetic evidence is
highly influenced by the legal system in which they operate
(Fuss et al., 2015).
The legal theorists Denno and McGivney (2013) have strongly
criticized Aspinwall’s study as significantly flawed due to
problems with both the design and the methodology. Their
main points of criticism are: (1) The hypothetical defendant
is featured with psychopathy, although this condition is not
fully recognized in the medical community and not listed in
the current or any prior edition of the DSM. Indeed, the
defendant in the real-life case upon which the study’s hypothetical
case is based claimed that he had an antisocial personality
disorder. (2) The study authors instructed the participants that
rehabilitation was not an alternative for the offender, because
treatment has been ineffective for adult psychopaths so far. This
directive substantially loaded the dice in favor of the judges’
sentencing decisions being influenced by considerations of future
dangerousness or retribution. (3) The study did not include
a control group, which was not told that the offender was
diagnosed with psychopathy. (4) In contrast to the real-life
case, the study’s defendant did not commit murder, but only an
aggravated assault. Insofar, the study’s hypothetical case differs
significantly from a typical behavioral genetics criminal case,
which involve capital crimes. (5) The study does not describe
the gene-environment interaction that is present in nearly any
real-world criminal case involving behavioral genetics evidence
(Denno and McGivney, 2013).
Denno and McGivney (2013) conclude that Aspinwall’s study
may interpret the effects of genetics evidence as a double-
edged sword, but that there is no support for such a simplistic
perspective in actual case law nor are the evidentiary hurdles the
same for each side of that sword. It is much more difficult for
the State to prove that genetic factors will predict a defendant’s
future dangerousness than it is for the defense to introduce such
information to suggest why a defendant should not be executed
(Denno and McGivney, 2013).
Denno and McGivney (2013) emphasize that Denno’s (2012)
comprehensive survey of criminal cases involving behavioral
genetics evidence did not reveal a single case in which such
evidence was used to support the likelihood of a defendant’s
future dangerousness. According to Denno’s survey, there was no
case in which the State introduced behavioral genetics evidence in
any capacity, much less as an aggravating factor. To the contrary,
only defense attorneys introduced behavioral genetics evidence
into court (Denno and McGivney, 2013).
Objective and Conception of the Present
Study
The main objective of this study is to investigate the influence of
different types of neurobiological explanations on the sentencing
decisions made by German law students. In particular, we
wanted to find out whether and to what extent neurobiological
explanations influence the students when it comes to evaluating
the legal and moral responsibility of a psychopathic offender,
deciding about a prison sentence or forensic psychiatric
hospital confinement, and to sentencing. Thereby, we
compared two different neurobiological explanations (namely,
a genetic explanation and a brain injury explanation) with no
neurobiological explanation.
The present study is based on the studies of Aspinwall
(Aspinwall et al., 2012) and Fuss (Fuss et al., 2015). However, we
modified their concept in order to address some of Denno and
McGivney’s (2013) criticism.
First, we presented a case of manslaughter (as in the real case
Mobley v. State) instead of aggravated assault (as in the studies of
Aspinwall and Fuss), because most real criminal cases, in which
genetic evidence is presented, are capital crime cases.
Second, we did not establish two groups of which one was
told that the genetic evidence was presented as mitigating by
the defense, and the other one was told that it was presented
as aggravating by the prosecution. The latter case is unrealistic
according to Denno’s surveys (Denno, 2012, 2015). Particularly,
for Germany, this case is unrealistic.
Third, we established three different groups: the first
group received genetic evidence, the second group received
neurobiological evidence for a brain trauma, and the third group
did not receive any biological evidence.
A further difference is that we interviewed law students
instead of judges. The main reason for this decision was
that we wanted to achieve a high response rate. We estimate
that the response rate among German judges in the study of
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Fuss (Fuss et al., 2015) is only about 2%. [Only 375 judges
responded, although in 2016, there were more than 15,000
judges at ordinary courts in Germany (Statista, 2018).] Due
to the extreme lack of judges and the severe overload of the
German courts, we expected that even fewer judges would
participate in a new survey among judges. A small response rate is
generally associated with a strong bias. In order to receive a high
response rate, we decided for investigating law students instead
of judges. In our experience, nearly all students participate
in surveys, which are recommended by their professors and
conducted directly after the courses. A further reason for
investigating law students was that they are the future decision-
makers in criminal cases, and they are particularly influenced




We recruited 317 law students from three major German
universities in the summer semester of 2018. We invited
the students after the lecture classes to participate in the
survey. They did receive neither course credit nor an
allowance for participating. We informed the students
about the voluntariness of participation, about the study
purposes and procedures, which guaranteed full anonymity and
compliance with the EU General Data Protection Regulation.
Ethics approval by the Local Ethics committee of Charité –
Universitätsmedizin Berlin was not applicable given the study
design, purpose, and procedures.
Design
This prospective quasi-experimental study used case vignettes
as independent variables (Aguinis and Bradley, 2014; Auspurg
and Hinz, 2014). We developed a specific case vignette to assess
the influence of three different explanations of psychopathy in
a criminal case of manslaughter. All three vignettes contain
the same information about a forensic expert’s testimony that
is said to report compelling evidence for the diagnosis of
“psychopathy.” The independent variable being manipulated
is the type of information supporting the expert diagnosis:
either no biological explanation of “psychopathy” versus a
neurobiological explanation (brain injury) versus a genetic
explanation (MAOA gene). All three vignettes contained the
same set of instructions and background information based
on the German Penal Code. The outcome measure is a
questionnaire on legal and moral responsibility, free will,
the type of custody, and the duration of the sentence.
The vignettes and the questionnaire can be found in the
Supplementary Material.
Participants from all three universities were allocated to
three experimental conditions (Figure 1). Each participant
received a questionnaire asking for demographic information
and presenting one of three types of vignettes. Each vignette
initially presented the exact same content and phrasing
of a criminal case. The case describes a young man who
committed manslaughter of his former girlfriend. All
vignettes reported that a psychiatric expert had assessed
the perpetrator as a psychopath. Each vignette gave a
different etiological explanation for the psychopathy
of the perpetrator, depending on the experimental
condition. The full text of the vignettes is presented in the
Supplementary Material. Participants received all textual
information in German translated by a German native speaker
(S.M.). We collected the data in the form of a paper and
pencil questionnaire.
For analytical reproducibility, we openly publish the statistical
analyses as R scripts together with the full data set on the Open
Science Framework website1.
Statistical Analysis
We conducted seven separate fixed-effect Analyses of Variance
(ANOVA) to examine group differences (main effect). The
seven dependent variables are (1) legal responsibility, (2)
moral responsibility, (3) free will, (4) the type of custody
assigned, (5) the duration of sentencing, (6) the influence of
the biological explanation on the type of custody assigned,
and (7) the influence of the biological explanation on the
duration of sentencing.
As between-subjects factor we used group allocation (“Absent
Biomechanism” group versus “Brain Injury” group versus
“MAOA Gene” group). We included all demographic variables
consisting of gender, number of semesters, level of biology
training, the acquaintance with psychopathy and home university
as between-subject factors into the analyses. For main effects
of group differences, a strict alpha-level of 0.005 was used due
to multiple testing of a family of related hypotheses about
the influence of the case vignette on the judgment of the law
students and the associated risk of an inflated false-positive rate
(Benjamin et al., 2018).
Post hoc t-tests were performed in the event of significant
group differences according to the conventional alpha-level
of 0.05 but were considered “exploratory” if above the
predefined alpha-level for the main effects (0.005). With
“exploratory,” we mean that the effect warrants replication
but can be considered suggestive to devise new hypotheses.
The multiple post hoc pairwise-comparisons can determine
between which specific pairs of groups, the difference of the
means is statistically significant. Given unequal group sizes,
the non-parametric Games–Howell test was chosen over the
more common Tukey’s post hoc test because the former
does not make assumptions about normality, equal variances,
or sample sizes.
For ANOVA, partial η2 was used as effect size (small
effect ≥ 0.01; medium effect ≥ 0.06; large effect ≥ 0.14).
Exploratory χ2-tests were used to examine potential
differences in demographic characteristics between the three
groups (Table 1).
Missing values arising from incomplete survey responses were
less than 3% and imputed using non-parametric random forests
(Stekhoven and Bühlmann, 2012). A priori Power to detect a
1https://osf.io/6r5ng/
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FIGURE 1 | Flow chart displaying the experimental design of this vignette study and the participant flow as required by the CONSORT statement (Schulz et al.,
2010).
medium effect size or larger in a balanced three group ANOVA
with α = 0.005 and a Power = 90% was estimated to be optimal
with a total sample size of n = 318.
All statistical analyses were carried out in R version 3.5.2.
RESULTS
In total, 317 law students returned the questionnaire at
least partially answered. Overall, 1.2% of the questionnaire
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TABLE 1 | Comparison of baseline characteristics between the groups.
Group
Absent Brain injury MAOA gene Row sum
Gender
Female 57 (18.4%) 55 (17.8%) 60 (19.4%) 172 (55.6%) χ2(2, N = 309) = 2.082, Cramer’s V = 0.082, p = 0.353
Male 54 (17.5%) 45 (14.6%) 38 (12.3%) 137 (44.4%)
Total 111 (35.9%) 100 (32.4%) 98 (31.7%) 309 (100%)
University
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 34 (10.7%) 44 (13.9%) 23 (7.3%) 101 (31.9%) χ2(4, N = 317) = 14.76, Cramer’s V = 0.153, p = 0.005
Freie Universität Berlin 55 (17.4%) 30 (9.5%) 46 (14.5%) 131 (41.4%)
Universität Potsdam 23 (7.3%) 31 (9.8%) 31 (9.8%) 85 (26.9%)
Total 112 (35.3%) 105 (33.1%) 100 (31.5%) 317 (100%)
Level of Biology training
Grammar school until 10th grade 9 (2.8%) 14 (4.4%) 12 (3.8%) 35 (11%) χ2 (4, N = 317) = 19.272, Cramer’s V = 0.174, p = 0.001
Until university entrance diploma 83 (26.2%) 89 (28.1%) 82 (25.9%) 254 (80.2%)
University classes (Biology/Medicine) 20 (6.3%) 2 (0.6%) 6 (1.9%) 28 (8.8%)
Total 112 (35.3%) 105 (33.1%) 100 (31.5%) 317 (100%)
Semester
First 2 (0.6%) 3 (0.9%) 0 (0%) 5 (1.5%) χ2(18, N = 317) = 32.283, Cramer’s V = 0.226,
Second 53 (16.7%) 28 (8.8%) 46 (14.5%) 127 (40%) Fisher’s p = 0.005
Third 0 (0%) 2 (0.6%) 2 (0.6%) 4 (1.2%)
Forth 56 (17.7%) 64 (20.2%) 46 (14.5%) 166 (52.4%)
Fifth 0 (0%) 2 (0.6%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.6%)
Sixth 1 (0.3%) 3 (0.9%) 3 (0.9%) 7 (2.1%)
Seventh 0 (0%) 1 (0.3%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.3%)
Eighth 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.6%) 2 (0.6%)
Eleventh 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.3%) 1 (0.3%)
Twelfth 0 (0%) 2 (0.6%) 0 (0%) 2 (0.6%)
Total 112 (35.3%) 105 (33.1%) 100 (31.5%) 317 (100%)
Acquaintance with psychopathy
Nothing at all 28 (9%) 17 (5.5%) 16 (5.1%) 61 (19.6%) χ2(12, N = 311) = 20.706, Cramer’s V = 0.182,
Movies 3 (1%) 8 (2.6%) 3 (1%) 14 (4.6%) Fisher’s p = 0.051
Fictional literature 5 (1.6%) 3 (1%) 2 (0.6%) 10 (3.2%)
School 8 (2.6%) 6 (1.9%) 5 (1.6%) 19 (6.1%)
Popular science magazines 6 (1.9%) 5 (1.6%) 1 (0.3%) 12 (3.8%)
TV documentations 28 (9%) 28 (9%) 17 (5.5%) 73 (23.5%)
Scientific literature 34 (10.9%) 36 (11.6%) 52 (16.7%) 122 (39.2%)
Total 112 (36%) 103 (33.1%) 96 (30.9%) 311 (100%)
response are incomplete. Most participating law students
were enrolled at the Freie Universität Berlin (41.4%),
followed by Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (31.9%) and
Universität Potsdam (26.9%). 55.6% of the law students
were female and 44.4% were male. Table 1 shows the
distribution of the sample characteristics between the
experimental groups.
Moral Responsibility
Fixed-Effects ANOVA indicate no significant differences
between the groups according to our predefined criterion
of significance [F(2, 294) = 5.15, p < 0.006, η2p = 0.03].
The partial η2 = 0.03 and 90% CI suggest that this effect
is of small effect size [0.01, 0.07]. Exploratory post hoc
t-tests revealed no significant differences between the
“Absent Biomechanism” group and the “Brain Injury”
group [t(214.79) = 1.80, p = 0.171], nor between the
”Brain Injury” group and the “MAOA gene” group
[t(196.16) = 1.08, p = 0.527], or the “MAOA gene” group
and the “Absent Biomechanism” group [t(204.98) = 2.71,
p = 0.020] (Figure 2).
Free Will
Fixed-Effects ANOVA indicate no significant differences
between the groups [F(2, 294) = 3.95, p < 0.02, η2p = 0.03].
The partial η2 = 0.03 and 90% CI suggest that this effect
is of small effect size [0.00, 0.06]. Exploratory post hoc
t-tests revealed no significant differences between the
“Absent Biomechanism” group and the “Brain Injury”
group [t(212.85) = 2.42, p = 0.043], nor between the
”Brain Injury” group and the “MAOA gene” group
[t(204.94) = 1.17, p = 0.475], or the “MAOA gene” group
and the “Absent Biomechanism” group [t(202.35) = 1.17,
p = 0.470] (Figure 3).
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FIGURE 2 | Plot of proportional cross-tables (contingency tables) showing the response to the question how morally responsible the offender is.
FIGURE 3 | Plot of proportional cross-tables (contingency tables) showing the response to the question to which degree the offender had a free will at the time of
manslaughter.
Legal Responsibility
Fixed-Effects ANOVA indicate significant differences between the
groups [F(2, 294) = 8.24, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.05]. The partial
η2 = 0.05 and 90% CI suggest that this effect is of small to
possibly moderate effect size [0.02, 0.10]. Post hoc t-tests revealed
significant differences between the “Absent Biomechanism”
group and the “Brain Injury” group [t(213.04) = 3.27, p = 0.004],
i.e., the group that received no biological explanation assigned
a higher legal responsibility. The mean response in the “Absent
Biomechanism” group is 2.29 (SD = 0.53) and in the “Brain
Injury” group 2.05 (SD = 0.54) with the response “1” meaning
“not at all legally responsible,” “2” being “diminished legally
responsible,” and “3” being “fully legally responsible.” Thus,
most students answered “diminished legally responsible,” but in
the “Brain Injury” group significantly more students considered
the perpetrator “not at all” legally responsible compared to the
“Absent Biomechanism” group. In the latter group, significantly
more students responded “fully legally responsible” compared to
the “Brain Injury” group (Figure 4).
Post hoc t-tests revealed no significant differences between the
“MAOA gene” and the “Brain Injury” group [t(200.53) = 2.20,
p = 0.074], nor between the “Absent Biomechanism” group and
the “MAOA gene” group [t(201.43) = 0.86, p = 0.666].
Type of Custody
Fixed-Effects ANOVA indicate no significant differences between
the groups [F(2, 302) = 4.12, p < 0.017, η2p = 0.03]. The partial
η2 = 0.03 and 90% CI suggest that this effect is of small
effect size [0.00, 0.06]. Post hoc t-tests revealed no significant
differences between the “Absent Biomechanism” group and
the “Brain Injury” group [t(215.00) = 2.26, p = 0.063], nor
between the ”Brain Injury” group and the “MAOA gene”
group [t(209.01) = 1.83, p = 0.163], or the “MAOA gene”
group and the “Absent Biomechanism” group [t(202.05) = 0.39,
p = 0.918] (Figure 5).
Duration of Sentencing
On a descriptive level, the mean prison sentence assigned by law
students differed only slightly and the group differences were
not significant. In the “Absent Biomechanism” group, the mean
prison sentence assigned was 9.15 years (SD = 3.47 years), in the
“Brain Injury” group 10.06 years (SD = 5.37 years) and in the
“MAOA Gene” group 10.54 years (SD = 3.84 years) (Table 2).
Fixed-Effects ANOVA indicate no significant differences
between the groups [F(2, 106) = 0.64, p < 0.530, η2p = 0.01]. The
partial η2 = 0.01 and 90% CI suggest that this effect is of zero to
very small effect size [0.00, 0.05].
For detailed descriptions of the results for all statistical
analyses calculated, see Supplementary Statistical Analysis.
One plausible suggestion is that the level of expertise and
background knowledge can influence decision-making. For this
reason, we included variables such as the number of semesters
of the participants, their home university, their level of biological
training and their acquaintance with psychopathy as covariates
in the fixed effect ANOVA. Doing so allowed us to study the
influence of these factors on the outcome such as sentencing.
However, in our sample, these factors did not had a significant
impact [number of semesters: F(1, 106) = 0.06, p < 0.814; level
of biological training: F(2, 106) = 0.03, p < 0.970; acquaintance
with psychopathy: F(6, 106) = 0.37, p < 0.895]. We had a
very homogeneous sample with 92.4% of the students being in
semester 2 or 4, and with 80.2% having their biology knowledge
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FIGURE 4 | Plot of proportional cross-tables (contingency tables) showing the response to the question how legally responsible the offender is.
FIGURE 5 | Plot of proportional cross-tables (contingency tables) showing the response to the question, which type of custody should be assigned to the offender
depending on the group of respondents.
from school until the university entrance diploma (Table 1).
We only found an association between the level of biological
training and the evaluation of moral responsibility, which we
consider exploratory as the p-value is greater than p = 0.005 [F(2,
294) = 4.11, p < 0.017]. This may give rise to the hypothesis that
the level of biological training affects the decision-making of law
students with regard to the assessment of moral responsibility,
but further research directly addressing this hypothesis would be
needed to investigate this hypothesis.
Influence of Expert Testimony on
Decision-Making
We also examined whether participants noticed being influenced
in their decision-making by the expert testimony. As described
in further detail in the Supplementary Materials S6, S7,
there was no significant difference between the participants’
responses of the three groups to the question whether the
expert testimony affected the decision to assign a prison
sentence or custody in a forensic hospital [F(2,302) = 0.38,
p < 0.685.]. There was also no group difference with regard to
the participants’ responses to the question whether the expert
testimony affected the duration of prison sentencing assigned
[F(2,105) = 0.69, p < 0.505].
TABLE 2 | Duration of sentencing depending on the group of respondents
(M = mean, SD = standard deviation, n = number of students in the group).
Group M (SD) [years in prison] n
Absent biomechanism 9.15 (3.47) 53
Brain injury 10.06 (5.37) 33
MAOA gene 10.54 (3.84) 35
DISCUSSION
Neuroscientific evidence has been increasingly introduced in
criminal trials all around the world to explain criminal
behavior. Our results indicate that the different neurobiological
information has only small effects on the assessment of law
students. However, neurobiological information is often used
when very high stakes are involved such as death penalty or
the verdict “not guilty” in capital crimes. In such contexts,
every bit of information that influences human judgment plays
a decisive role. In our study, the strongest effect was observed
with regard to legal responsibility. Law students were asked
to rate the legal responsibility of a perpetrator after having
received one of three different kinds of information about the
perpetrator. Overall, there was a significant difference in the
assessment of legal responsibility of the law students depending
on the kind of information received. Pair-wise comparisons
of the groups showed that students who received information
describing a major brain injury of the perpetrator rated the legal
responsibility significantly lower than the students who did not
receive a biological explanation. However, no similar effect was
found for information describing a MAOA gene susceptibility
for psychopathy.
Our results can be compared to previous findings of the
studies of Aspinwall (Aspinwall et al., 2012) and Fuss (Fuss et al.,
2015), although we modified the study design in light of Denno
and McGivney’s (2013) criticism. Our sample size (N = 317) is
comparable to the above-mentioned studies (Aspinwall et al.,
2012: N = 181; Fuss et al., 2015: N = 372).
Similar to our main finding of reduced legal responsibility
in case of a brain injury, the legal responsibility in the study
of Fuss (Fuss et al., 2015) was significantly lower in the
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group that received biomechanistic information compared to no
biological information.
In addition to legal responsibility, we examined the influence
of neuroscientific evidence on law students’ assessment of moral
responsibility, of free will, the type of custody, and of the duration
of sentence. Due to the multiplicity of statistical analyses, we used
a strict criterion for significance of p< 0.005 as recommended by
Benjamin et al. (2018) and considered the p< 0.05 as exploratory.
The effect of brain injury evidence on legal responsibility was
the only effect that was significant given the strict criterion.
However, on a more exploratory interpretation, we observed
some suggestive differences of the influence of neuroscientific
evidence on the students’ assessment of moral responsibility and
free will. The law students who received biological information
about the MAOA gene, tended to assign less moral responsibility
compared to the students who received no biological explanation.
In addition, the free will of the perpetrator was assessed to be
lower by the group of students who received information about
a brain injury compared to students who received no biological
explanation. Due to the exploratory character of these analyses,
these findings warrant replication in an independent sample
before taken to represent real effects.
The mean prison sentence assigned by law students differed
only slightly, and the group differences were not significant
(“Absent Biomechanism” group: 9.15 years, “Brain Injury” group:
10.06 years, “MAOA Gene”: 10.54 years).
In comparison, in Aspinwall’s study (Aspinwall et al., 2012) the
mean prison sentence was higher than in our sample. Important
to note is that the mean prison sentence was lower in the group
with genetic evidence (12.83 years) than in the group without
biological explanation (13.93 years) (Aspinwall et al., 2012). In
Fuss’ study (Fuss et al., 2015), the average prison sentence was not
affected by the presentation of neurogenetic evidence. Also in our
study, the prison sentence was not influenced by the presentation
of biological evidence.
LIMITATIONS AND STRENGTHS
The ecological validity of this study can be doubted, as well
as that of all previous studies. As Scurich (2018) has recently
pointed out, it is doubtful that a cursory written expert’s
report is remotely similar to a real expert’s testimony who
presents his results in court, uses PowerPoint presentations
and is subjected to cross examination. For future studies,
more realistic simulations should be used to increase the
ecological validity.
This is a prospective study with experimental control to
increase internal validity. Since law students are the upcoming
judicial decision-makers in the legal system, the study is also
externally valid in respect of the population examined. However,
quasi-experimental study designs come with certain risk of bias.
In particular, the lack of randomization prevents any strong
claims ruling out that non-measured variables confound the
results. For mitigating the risk of bias, we included theoretically
relevant demographic differences between groups as between-
factors into the statistical analysis. Post hoc tests were adjusted
for multiple comparison and the statistical power was sufficient
to find at least medium effects.
A strength of our paper is that we rigorously corrected the
significance level for multiple testing (Benjamin et al., 2018).
A further strength is that our statistical analysis accounts for
the influence of demographic factors such as gender, the number
of semesters, and level of biological education.
CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this research was to understand the
judgments of German law students depending on two different
types of neuroscientific evidence being presented in the
courtroom. The question is whether biological information
influences the judgment of law students. Indeed, the “Brain
Injury” group evaluated the perpetrator less legally responsible
than the “Absent Biomechanism” group.
The question whether neuroscientific and genetic evidence
in criminal cases is a double-edged sword or not, has been
answered differently by different studies. The results from the
experimental studies from Germany (Fuss et al., 2015, and the
present study) are partly inconsistent with the results from
the experimental studies from the United States (Gurley and
Marcus, 2008; Aspinwall et al., 2012; Greene and Cahill, 2012;
Appelbaum and Scurich, 2014; Allen et al., 2019). In contrast
to the United States studies, the German studies did not
find a mitigating effect of neuroscientific evidence in terms
of the duration of sentencing. The study of Fuss found that
neurogenetics evidence leads to more decisions for forensic
psychiatric hospital, which has the consequence of a longer and
indefinite detention (Fuss et al., 2015).
For investigating whether a double-edged sword exists,
it is important to compare the results of surveys of real
criminal cases from different countries, too. Indeed, they provide
mixed results, too.
For the United States, Denno has comprehensively analyzed
criminal cases from the United States, of which 553 addressed
neuroscience evidence for the defendant (from 1992 to 2002)
(Denno, 2012), and 81 addressed behavioral genetics evidence
(including family history evidence and MAOA deficiency
evidence) (from 1994 to 2007) (Denno, 2015). Denno’s studies
systematically investigated how United States courts assess the
mitigating and aggravating effects of neuroscience or genetic
evidence, respectively. She found that neuroscience evidence
is typically raised in cases where defendants are facing the
death penalty, a life sentence or a substantial prison sentence
(Denno, 2015). Usually neuroscience evidence is offered to
mitigate punishments in the way that traditional criminal law
has always allowed, especially in the penalty phase of death
penalty trials (Denno, 2015). Neuroscience evidence is only
rarely used to bolster a defendant’s future dangerousness (Denno,
2015). In the rare cases when prosecutors utilized neuroscientific
evidence to implicate a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes,
they typically did so only by building upon the evidence first
introduced by a defense expert (Denno, 2015). The same is
valid for behavioral genetics evidence, which has been applied
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almost exclusively as mitigating evidence in death penalty
cases (Denno, 2012). Between 2007 and 2011, the State never
presented behavioral genetics evidence as aggravating evidence
or for indicating the future dangerousness of the defendant
(Denno, 2012). United States courts accept both neuroscience
and behavioral genetics evidence (Denno, 2012, 2015). They
even expect attorneys to raise neuroscience evidence when
possible on behalf of their clients. Courts grant defendants
their “ineffective assistance of counsel” claims when attorneys
fail to pursue mitigating neuroscience or genetic evidence
(Denno, 2015). Sometimes courts even penalize attorneys who
neglect the obligation to pursue mitigating neuroscience evidence
(Denno, 2015). Denno concludes that her study “controverts
the popular image of neuroscience evidence as a double-edged
sword – one that will either get defendants off the hook altogether
or unfairly brand them as posing a future danger to society”
(Denno, 2015).
Farahany (2015) also examined the use of neurological and
behavioral genetic evidence in United States criminal law. For
that, she and her team investigated 1,585 judicial opinions issued
between 2005 and 2012. Although many scientists discredit the
use of neurobiological evidence in criminal law, and some call
for “an outright ban on its use” due to significant methodological
problems, Farahany (2015) concludes that neuroscience is
“already entrenched in the United States legal system.” She
found that neurobiological evidence is increasingly used in
criminal cases (Farahany, 2015). Neurobiological evidence is
used broadly, and is not limited to capital cases as mitigating
evidence (Farahany, 2015). Farahany states that neurobiological
evidence is “in a rarified position of must-investigate evidence,”
and summarizes: “Defense counsels are ineffective if they fail to
mount a defense at all, sleep through an entire (but not just parts
of) a trial, or if they fail to investigate a probable neurobiological
abnormality in a defendant.” (Farahany, 2015).
In the Netherlands, neuroscientific and genetic evidence is
in most cases no double-edged sword. According to De Kogel
and Westgeest’s (2015) analysis of 231 criminal cases published
between 2000 and 2012, neuroscientific evidence is introduced
as mitigating evidence in the majority of the cases found. Only
in some cases, defendants were considered diminished or not
responsible for their crime, but received a longer sentence,
such as a custody in a forensic psychiatric hospital that can
be periodically extended. In some other cases, the defendants
did not receive longer sentences despite their “untreatable”
neurobiological deficits, when the experts saw room for reduction
of recidivism risk (De Kogel and Westgeest, 2015).
For England and Wales, Catley and Claydon (2015) analyzed
204 criminal cases from 2005 to 2012. They found that
most appellants, who used neuroscientific evidence when they
appealed against conviction, were unsuccessful. However, in the
few successful cases, the neuroscientific evidence had nearly
always a central role in the successful appeal (Catley and Claydon,
2015). The authors do not discuss whether they found the double-
edged sword effect in the cases analyzed.
However, in Canada, neuroscientific evidence is a double-
edged sword for criminal offenders according to Chandler’s
(2015) analysis of 133 criminal cases published between
2008 and 2012. In Canada, the most common form of
biological evidence considered is fetal alcohol spectrum disorder,
followed by medical history of traumatic brain injury and
neuropsychological testing (Chandler, 2015). Functional MRI
investigations and genetic tests did not play any role in
the court decisions analyzed (Chandler, 2015). Chandler
(2015) found that neuroscientific evidence suggested diminished
capacity, but also tends to increase judgements about risk and
dangerousness given the view that brain injuries can sometimes
be managed but not cured.
For Australia, Alimardani and Chin (2018) found on grounds
of a systematic review that in some cases, neuroscientific
evidence presents a double-edged sword. It can serve to either
aggravate or mitigate a sentence. Because the courts also consider
the protection of society, a sentence can be prolonged when
neuroscientific evidence suggests that the offender poses a
particular risk of re-offending. On the other side, neuroscientific
evidence can suggest a reduced risk of future offending, and thus
support a more lenient sentence. Furthermore, neuroscientific
evidence can mitigate the offender’s moral culpability and
thus reduce the significance of general deterrence, so that the
sentence can be mitigated. In most cases analyzed by the
authors, neuroscience evidence only leads to mitigation and
was rarely used as evidence for the offender’s risk of recidivism
(Alimardani and Chin, 2018).
For Iran, Alimardani (2018) has investigated the potential
applicability of neuroscientific evidence in the criminal justice
system. He demonstrates that neuroscientific evidence can be
used inter alia both for establishing the insanity defense and for
mitigating the sentence for some kinds of crimes. He concludes
that neuroscientific evidence can result on the one hand in
a successful defense of insanity and thus in the offender’s
discharge. On the other hand, if it indicates a condition, which
can put the society in danger, the offender will be detained
in a psychotherapeutic facility for an indeterminate period
(Alimardani, 2018). Therefore, neuroscientific evidence may be
a double-edged sword in the Iranian criminal justice system.
For Germany, an investigation of the influence of
neuroscientific and genetic evidence in real criminal court
cases has not been published so far to the best of our knowledge.
In summary, it can be said that neuroscience evidence can
present a double-edged sword in Canada, Netherlands, Australia,
and Iran, but not in the United States. However, even in the
countries, in which a double-edged sword effect might occur,
neuroscience evidence seems to lead more often to mitigation
than to aggravation of sentencing.
Therefore, the question whether neuroscientific and genetic
evidence in criminal cases is a double-edged sword, cannot
be answered in general. Rather, the answer depends strongly
on the given system of criminal justice. In the United States,
punishment is much harder than in most other Western
countries; particularly, other Western countries have abolished
the capital punishment since many years. On the other side, in
the United States, the standards for admitting mitigating evidence
at sentencing are purposefully lax (Segal, 2016). The laxity in the
admission of mitigating evidence could be the other side of the
coin of extreme severity in sentencing.
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Furthermore, the type of criminal justice system (common law
system vs. civil law system) presumably has a significant impact
on the influence of biological evidence on sentencing. Because the
roles of professional and lay judges differ in the different systems,
and because neuroscientific evidence influences the two groups
of judges presumably in different ways.
In the common law system, the jury of lay judges decides
whether to convict or to acquit the defendant, whereas the
professional judge decides about the penalty (whether detention
should take place in prison or in a forensic hospital and the
length of the sentence). In the United States, in criminal law
cases, in which the death penalty is a prospective sentence,
a “death-qualified jury” has to be established. Such a jury
has to be composed of jurors who will fairly consider
all punishment options, including the death penalty and
life imprisonment.
In the civil law system, a jury is called only in court
cases involving serious criminal offenses. The jury’s influence
on sentencing is much smaller than in the common law
system. In Germany, in the case of homicide, the jury court
consists of three professional and two lay judges. The lay
judges are equal judges, who have a full say in the decision-
making process about the guilt of the accused and subsequently
on the sentence.
Therefore, it is necessary to carefully distinguish the results of
studies, which have investigated the effect of biological evidence
on the sentencing of professional judges vs. the sentencing of
potential lay judges.
The improvement of the ecological validity of experimental
research in this field should be in the focus of future research. For
that, it is important that the experimental research learns from
the research on real criminal cases and vice versa.
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